Europe is trapped in a cycle where debt is being passed round and round in circles – the banks are bust so the Irish government bails them out; the Irish government’s debt is owned by other banks and if the government defaults, they go bust; the EU as a whole then tries to rescue both in opaque arrangements which are only sustainable because Ireland is so small; now Britain is getting involved.

Responding to debt crises in this way is entirely unsustainable, we potentially have crises in Italy and Spain around the corner and nobody can shoulder their indebtedness.



The EU has been sitting around doing very little for the last two years (except for dreaming up new regulations for the banks, hedge funds and private equity). What it and the nation states involved should have been doing is ensuring that banks can be wound up in an orderly fashion so that all providers of capital and credit potentially lose money except for depositors who were insured at the beginning of the crisis. The EU governments are simply underwriting mistakes made by private businesses and then blaming it all on “casino capitalists”.


The Irish government’s debt position would not, in fact, be that bad if it were not for the bank guarantees. Ireland is not another Greece (or Italy) – its underlying position is sound. The key issue has not changed since the beginning of the crisis – it is the need to recognise failed financial institutions for what they are and not load the cost of their bad loans onto taxpayers in general. At the beginning of the crisis, the bailouts were perhaps understandable; we have now had two years to sort out proper legal mechanisms for winding up banks.



Philip Booth 154x154
Philip Booth is Academic and Research Director at the Institute of Economic Affairs and Professor of Finance, Public Policy and Ethics at St. Mary's University, Twickenham. From 2002-2015 he was Professor of Insurance and Risk Management at Cass Business School. Previously, Philip Booth worked for the Bank of England as an advisor on financial stability issues and he was also Associate Dean of Cass Business School and held various other academic positions at City University. He has written widely, including a number of books, on investment, finance, social insurance and pensions as well as on the relationship between Catholic social teaching and economics. He is Deputy Editor of Economic Affairs and on the editorial boards of various other academic journals. Philip is a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries and an honorary member of the Society of Actuaries of Poland. He has previously worked in the investment department of Axa Equity and Law and was been involved in a number of projects to help develop actuarial professions and actuarial, finance and investment professional teaching programmes in Central and Eastern Europe. Philip has a BA in Economics from the University of Durham and a PhD from City University.

1 thought on “Sort out mechanisms to wind up banks”

  1. Posted 23/11/2010 at 22:33 | Permalink

    “What it and the nation states involved should have been doing is ensuring that banks can be wound up in an orderly fashion so that all providers of capital and credit potentially lose money except for depositors who were insured at the beginning of the crisis.”

    Correct. I’ve been trying to explain this, with proper balance sheets and so on ever since Northern Rock went *pop* (click my name for original blog post).

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