Hayek – much more than money

Last night’s BBC programme on F. A. Hayek was interesting and, like the Keynes programme, gave the subject a fair crack of the whip. It is not by way of criticism that I write this blog post, but a comment by Stephanie Flanders raised an issue in my mind that deserves further elaboration.

The series of programmes had a focus on money. I guess the BBC would have struggled to get an audience for a series which had as its theme the analysis of extended economic orders and structures. As such, there was a lot on money last night and quite a bit of material on the difficulty of central planning. There was a little less emphasis on the way in which the market produces stable extended orders and the way in which markets can regulate themselves. In a very different context, these ideas have been developed by Professor Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Laureate. She is one person who Krugman could not accuse of producing ideas that were not borne out by history – her whole academic method was to research exactly what was happening in real time.

At one point in the programme Stephanie Flanders pointed to Big Bang in 1986. She said (correctly) that Big Bang de-regulated financial markets. She said (correctly) that many Austrian economists argue that to underpin financial institutions with implicit government support, whilst allowing them to do what they like, is asking for trouble. However, what was important for Hayek was not whether or not markets were regulated, but by whom they were regulated. The most important event of 1986 was to move the regulation of financial markets from the market to the state (at first via a series of quangos).

Until 1986, from 1801 – or arguably before, securities markets had been entirely self-regulating. The stock exchange was a private body established in its modern form in 1801. From even before that time, it had conventions to ensure that those dealing were trustworthy. The stock exchange itself brought in the restrictions stopping those involved in broking from holding investments on their own book to prevent conflicts of interest. Those who broke the rules were not allowed to be members and, in the early days, the exchange faced the prospect of parliamentary action by those who objected to the exchange enforcing its rules and excluding certain people from dealing. Of course, anybody was free to set up a competing exchange and dealing off-exchange was entirely possible. A competing exchange could have allowed ‘dual capacity’. In the end, the London exchange was so successful with such high standards of probity that its motto became ‘my word is my bond’ – much better than today’s ‘I have ticked all the boxes so everything is okay’ attitude.

This was an evolved institution. There was the possibility of competition. The exchange could not easily have been designed by a statutory regulator – it could only come about through the trial and error process of competition. The exchange had a strong rule book both for members and for companies that were listing. This was not the brutality of market competition that is often portrayed by its opponents, but a sophisticated social order to provide for the regulation of the market. It was swept away in Big Bang. The market itself produced a more highly regulated order than government – but one that was always open to competition.

Interestingly, at roughly the same time, a government authority banned life insurance companies from fixing commissions paid to insurance brokers through a cartel. This was not a water-tight cartel – there were some companies (who often had poorer reputations) that paid higher commissions. The government saw this cartel as a distortion of the market. In fact, it was the market at work. There may have been some benefits to the insurance companies in the cartel because they forced commission levels down (to the detriment of insurance brokers), but the main benefits to both insurance companies and brokers was that it created a relatively clean market where brokers had incentives to recommend on the basis of the quality of the product rather than the level of commission. As long as the cartel was open to competition (and this one clearly was), the damage to the market from the cartel would have been very limited. Interestingly, the FSA is still today – 25 years on and several mis-selling scandals later – trying to clear up the mess that was, at least in part, caused by this decision to break up the cartel. The FSA is seeking to regulate the insurance intermediary market ever more in order to try to ensure that advice is unbiased – and, in doing so, the FSA is ironically reducing competition possibly to a greater extent than the cartel ever did.

Our understanding of how markets develop these sophisticated forms of economic and social co-operation is one of Hayek’s greatest legacies. These orders can never be designed; they can only evolve. These orders often also add a deeply social aspect to the market economy (think about all the self-regulating sports that evolved in this country – including soccer). Ignoring this lesson is perhaps another sense in which there has, perhaps, been too much Chicago and not enough Vienna in our financial markets.

Philip Booth is Senior Academic Fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs. He is also Director of the Vinson Centre and Professor of Economics at the University of Buckingham and Professor of Finance, Public Policy and Ethics at St. Mary’s University, Twickenham. He also holds the position of (interim) Director of Catholic Mission at St. Mary’s having previously been Director of Research and Public Engagement and Dean of the Faculty of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences. From 2002-2016, Philip was Academic and Research Director (previously, Editorial and Programme Director) at the IEA. From 2002-2015 he was Professor of Insurance and Risk Management at Cass Business School. He is a Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Federal Studies at the University of Kent and Adjunct Professor in the School of Law, University of Notre Dame, Australia. Previously, Philip Booth worked for the Bank of England as an adviser on financial stability issues and he was also Associate Dean of Cass Business School and held various other academic positions at City University. He has written widely, including a number of books, on investment, finance, social insurance and pensions as well as on the relationship between Catholic social teaching and economics. He is Deputy Editor of Economic Affairs. Philip is a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries and an honorary member of the Society of Actuaries of Poland. He has previously worked in the investment department of Axa Equity and Law and was been involved in a number of projects to help develop actuarial professions and actuarial, finance and investment professional teaching programmes in Central and Eastern Europe. Philip has a BA in Economics from the University of Durham and a PhD from City University.

4 thoughts on “Hayek – much more than money”

  1. Posted 25/09/2012 at 13:21 | Permalink

    It is unfair to call ’86 de-regulation it was just a movemnt in regulation. And though there were flaws it did open up competition in a lot of the markets. Though this theme was not continued to ensure competition continued to increase.

  2. Posted 25/09/2012 at 14:20 | Permalink

    In a programme emphasising money so much, in the context of ‘the state versus the market’, I was hoping (I won’t say ‘expecting’) to see Ricardo quoted: “Experience shows that neither a state nor a bank ever had the unrestricted power of issuing paper money without abusing that power.” Flanders failed to explore the likely ultimate result of Quantitative Easing [QE]. And Flanders again referred to Roosevelt’s activities in the Great Depression without this time pointing out that his attempts to bring it to an end did not work… It may be that Keynes versus Hayek has been amply discussed over the past two or three years (though in a programme starring each of them it would have seemed relevant), but I could have done with a bit more on Hayek versus Friedman. The programme could have been a lot worse; but it could also have been a lot better. Maybe radio would have done a better job than television.

  3. Posted 27/09/2012 at 14:46 | Permalink

    “Anyone could set up a competing exchange” and “dealing off-exchange was perfectly possible” – this is important.

    And is the understanding that a cartel (or a guild) is only bad if it is COMPULSORY.

    Governments (funedmentally mislead by the absurd “perfect competition” concept) simply do not understand what a market is and should be.

  4. Posted 29/09/2012 at 08:35 | Permalink

    Yes, I remember asking somebody setting up all the SROs about this at a dinner in 1987 (it was the day after the stock market crash as it happens). I said words to the effect that, even if I am a qualified person and have a big sign up saying “I am unregulated, take this advice at your own risk/deal at your own risk” you cannot advise or deal and that this monopoly approach to regulation was, in itself, a problem. He replied by saying that you could, in fact, still invest in property in an unregulated environment (which is still true). The person next to me turned and said “if it is okay for property, why not for securities?”.

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