Firstly, the FTT includes a wide definition of financial institutions – those entities ‘undertaking…carrying out…acquisition of holdings in undertakings.’ How I read this, it could include holding companies, private equity and venture capital, too. If that is the case not only the financial sector will be affected but also the other sectors of the economy. Raising venture capital as well as the takeover of companies (if shares are involved) will be taxed. I am not sure whether this is the intention. To overcome this shortcoming further regulation would be necessary.
Secondly, financial transactions between European citizens and financial institutions outside of Europe will be taxed. As the proposal makes financial institutions liable for the payment of the FTT, the bank outside Europe is obliged to pay the tax. I wonder how this could be administered. The EU suggests that also every party to a transaction should become jointly liable for the FTT. But how does the tax authority know about the transaction? Further intrusive regulation would surely be forthcoming to address this.
Finally, the FTT proposal apparently does not take into account that relocated trading will not be under supervision of European authorities. If banks relocate trading via subsidiaries to countries outside Europe, risk positions could further affect their parent banks. However, the subsidiaries might not be under control of European banking supervision. That would certainly counteract the aim of the FTT to avoid future crises. Thus there will be strong incentives for the EU to press for stricter controls in countries outside the EU.
These are just three points that question the practicability of the proposed FTT besides the well known arguments. The tax would not only result in relocation of business and loss of income but also in more regulation and bureaucracy. A new spiral of costly regulation would ensue. Politicians should therefore think twice before supporting the FTT.